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12Abstract
This paper analyzes cooperation between sovereign national authorities in the supervision
and regulation of a multinational bank. We take a political economy approach to regulation
and assume that supervisors maximize the welfare of their own country. The communication
between the supervisors is modeled as a ￿cheap talk￿ game. We show that: (1) unless the interests
of the countries are perfectly aligned, ￿rst best closure regulation cannot be implemented; (2)
the more aligned the interests are, the higher is welfare; (3) the bank can allocate its investments
strategically across countries to escape closure.
Keywords: multinational banks, supervision, closure, cheap talk.
JEL codes: F36, G21, G28, L51.
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In view of the steady increase of international banking activities, the appropriate regulation
and supervision of multinational banks become more and more relevant. Most countries have
adopted the BIS guidelines for international banking supervision, so that basic supervisory
responsibilities are divided between the relevant home- and host country authorities. More-
over, bilateral Memoranda of Understanding specify how information exchange between these
authorities is organised.
In this paper we argue that these types of agreements are not suﬃcient to guarantee a
complete ￿ow of information between banking supervisors. While ￿hard￿ information such as
information contained in balance sheets is easily transmitted, supervisors also have access to
￿softer￿ information that may not be easily quanti￿ed. This could, for instance, be informal
information about borrowers, or market rumours about possible diﬃculties of a ￿nancial insti-
tution. Such information can be important in assessing the ￿nancial health of a bank. However,
because of its nature, it may not automatically be reported to the foreign authorities engaged
in the supervision of the institution.
We study the supervision of a multinational bank which conducts its foreign activities
through a branch. In line with the Basle guidelines, its foreign activities are supervised by
the host country supervisor, which has to transmit information about the branch to the home
c o u n t r ys u p e r v i s o r .T h eh o m ec o u n t r ys u p e r v i s o rh a st h e nt od e c i d ew h e t h e rt h eb a n ks h o u l d
be closed or not.
We take a political economy approach and assume that each supervisor is concerned only
with the welfare of its local stakeholders, but not with overall welfare. It is argued that gener-
ally, the supervisors￿ preferences for closure will diﬀer. This is because usually, the costs and
bene￿ts of closing the bank diﬀer across countries for a number of reasons. First, the bank may
conduct diﬀerent activities in the two countries, therefore the exposure of stakeholders that
the supervisors care about could diﬀer. Furthermore, the bank might not be of equal systemic
importance in the two countries. Finally, the institutional environment plays a role.
We show that if the supervisors￿ preferences for closure do not coincide, the host country
supervisor may have incentives to misreport its private information in order to obtain a prefer-
able outcome. The exchange of information is modelled as a cheap talk game. It is shown that
the only way to credibly transmit information about the branch is to send an imprecise signal
that reveals some of the information that the host country supervisor has but not all. This has
several interesting implications. First, the ￿rst-best closure decision can never be reached. It is
even possible that the bank is closed even though from an overall welfare perspective it would
be better to leave it open and vice versa. Second, the joint expected welfare is increasing in the
precision of the signal sent by the host country supervisor. It is shown that this implies that in
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March 2004In the second part of the paper we study how the bank may exploit the divergences in
interest between the supervisors and allocate its activities strategically. We show that, within
the context of the paper, the bank tries to choose its loan portfolio mainly in order to avoid
closure as often as possible. By allocating its assets strategically in both countries, it can
take advantage of a laxer closure decision that results from the inability of the supervisors to
exchange detailed information about the bank. Finally, we analyse in which country the bank
would optimally allocate its headquarters.
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The troubles surrounding the supervision, and later closure, of the multinational bank ￿Bank
of Credit and Commerce International￿ (BCCI) was a wake-up call for banking supervisors
worldwide. It demonstrated how opportunistic behavior by national banking supervisors can
create loopholes in the supervision that allow a multinational bank to hide from close super-
visory scrutiny.1 At the same time, prudent supervision of multinational banks is increasingly
important as banking becomes more and more international. Amihud et al. (2002), for ex-
ample, ￿nd that the number of cross-border bank mergers has increased steadily, and more
than quintupled from 1985 until 1998. Similarly, in the euro area one can observe a signi￿cant
increase in international merger activity involving credit institutions: between 1996 and 2001,
the number of M&As between domestic and foreign banks increased by 77% to 55 per year.2
This trend towards more multinational banks is expected to continue as new technologies, such
as Internet banking, and deregulation lower the barriers to entry into the previously protected
national markets.
Financial regulators have long been aware of the problems surrounding the supervision of
multinational banks, and considerable eﬀorts have been invested in developing a sound regula-
tory framework. Most of this work has taken place under the aegis of the Bank of International
Settlements (BIS). The key document is the so-called ￿Basel Concordat￿ (BIS, 1983) that consists
of recommended guidelines of best practices. Together with the ￿Core Principles for Eﬀective
Banking Supervision￿ (BIS, 1997) that were established following the BCCI crisis, they are now
followed by many countries.
With the implementation of the Basel guidelines, responsibilities between diﬀerent national
authorities in banking supervision are now clearly divided. Moreover, many countries have
established bilateral agreements (Memoranda of Understanding) that specify how information
exchange should be organized. Still, in this paper we argue that these types of agreements
are not suﬃcient to guarantee a complete ￿ow of information between banking supervisors.
While ￿hard￿ information such as information contained in balance sheets is easily transmitted,
supervisors also have access to ￿softer￿ information that may not be easily quanti￿ed. This
could, for instance, be informal information about borrowers, or market rumors about possible
diﬃculties of a ￿nancial institution. Such information can be important in assessing the ￿nancial
health of a bank. However, because of its nature, it may not automatically be reported to the
foreign authorities engaged in the supervision of the institution.
In this paper, we analyze voluntary exchange of soft information between national authorities
in the supervision of a multinational bank. The setup of the model is as follows: A bank is
operating in two countries. The bank is legally incorporated in the ￿home country￿, and conducts
all business in the ￿host country￿ through a branch. In line with the Basel rules, its consolidated
1The liquidation of Bank of Credit and Commerce International has been running for more than 11 years
and the cost has passed $1.2bn (The Guardian, May 15, 2003).
2Source: SDC Thompson Financial
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the home country supervisor has the choice of closing the bank or leaving it open. Both
supervisors have access to private information that is relevant for the closure decision. The
home country supervisor will thus base its decision on its own information and on information
transmitted by the host country supervisor. It should be noted that we restrict our analysis to
banks that operate through branches, but not to subsidiaries. International bank subsidiaries
can be closed down independently by host country authorities, so the analysis would be a
diﬀerent one.
We take a political economy approach to supervision and assume that supervisors seek to
maximize the welfare of their own country, disregarding the welfare of the other country. It is
shown that the supervisors do not always agree whether to close the bank, because generally
the two countries will be aﬀected diﬀerently by the closure decision. The costs and bene￿ts
of closing the bank may diﬀer across countries for a number of reasons. First, the bank may
conduct diﬀerent activities in the two countries, therefore the exposure of stakeholders that
the supervisors care about could diﬀer. Furthermore, the bank might not be of equal systemic
importance in the two countries. Finally, the institutional environment plays a role. In Europe,
for example, depositors in host countries are typically insured by the home country deposit
insurance (exceptions arise when the coverage diﬀers in home and host country), which could
create a further asymmetry in interests.
The supervisors are both sovereign and have to cooperate as equals. To capture this idea,
the communication is modelled as a ￿cheap talk￿ game in the spirit of Crawford and Sobel
(1982). The host country supervisor reports, orally or written, to the home country supervisor
about the state of the branch located in its jurisdiction. However, as talk is cheap, the host
country supervisor reveals only as much information as serves its own interests.
In the ￿rst part of the paper, we show that as long as the interests of the supervisors do
not perfectly coincide, the host country supervisor does not reveal all the information that it
possesses. More accurately, it does not reveal as detailed information as it could. Because of
this, it is not possible to implement the ￿rst best closure regulation. The closure regulation is
not unambiguously too soft or too hard. Rather, it is an inherent feature of the equilibrium
that there will be mistakes both of ￿type I￿ (the bank is left open where it should be closed) and
￿type II￿ (the bank is closed where it should be left open). Finally, it is shown that the better
aligned the interests of the supervisors are, the more detailed information can be exchanged,
and the higher is the welfare resulting from the closure decision.
In the second part, we analyze how the equilibrium closure regulation in￿uences the behavior
of the bank. We ￿rst show that the bank has an incentive to select the country that is least
inclined to close it as its home country. Afterwards, we study the bank￿s investment decision.
It is found that the bank can strategically allocate its investments across the two countries in
order to escape closure. When the interests of the two countries are relatively closely aligned,
the bank concentrates its investments in the country that is least inclined to close it. More
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disaligned. This forces the home country supervisor to base its closure decision partly on
information received from the host country. As this information is imprecise due to the con￿ict
of interests, it results in a lower probability of closure for the bank.
A surge of interest has evolved around cross-border consolidation in the ￿nancial industry as
well as contagion in international ￿nancial markets (Berger et al., 2000; Claessens and Forbes,
2001). Greater attention has also been given to the supervision and regulation of multinational
￿nancial institutions, a topic left virtually unexplored in the academic literature until a few
years ago.
A number of recent papers study the eﬀects of international regulatory competition. Acharya
(2003), for example, shows that competition in capital standards may result in a race-to-bottom
as regulators attempt to further the competitive position of their domestic banks. Dalen and
Olsen (2003) illustrate how regulators may try to counter this eﬀect by inducing banks to choose
assets of higher quality. In a similar vein, Dell￿Ariccia and Marquez (2003) study the conditions
under which national regulators are willing to let a supranational authority set capital standards.
The desirability of centralization versus decentralization of banking regulation is also analyzed
by Calzolari and Loranth (2001).
A key assumption in our analysis is that national supervisors have access to some local
information. This is also the point of departure in recent work by Holthausen and Rłnde (2002)
and Repullo (2001). Holthausen and Rłnde show that public involvement in the regulation of
large-value payment systems is desirable in spite of opportunistic behavior by the national
regulators. Repullo demonstrates how lack of cooperation among national supervisors can lead
to softer closure regulation for internationally active banks. This creates, in turn, an incentive
for banks to become international through mergers or takeovers. We also look at closure of
international banks here, but our focus is quite diﬀerent. In particular, Repullo assumes away
information exchange among the supervisors whereas it is the endogenous communication that
is at the heart of this paper.
Related to our study is also the literature on closure regulation of banks: Acharya and
Dreyfus (1989) derive the optimal closure rule in the presence of deposit insurance; Maliath
and Mester (1994) look at subgame perfect closure rules; Fries et al. (1997) analyze diﬀerent
ways of resolving ￿nancial distress. These papers generally consider a richer environment than
we do but look at domestic banks only.
The theoretical setup of our paper is related to several recent papers that build upon Craw-
ford and Sobel (1982). Both Glazer and Rubinstein (2003) as well as Levy and Razin (2003)
analyze games with multidimensional cheap talk. However, in their settings, information on
all dimensions is held by the sender, while the receiver does not have any private information.
Contrarily, in our paper, both the sender and the receiver have some information that is not
known to the other party.
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and second best closure rules. Afterwards, the information exchange between the supervisors is
analyzed. We determine the equilibria of the game and discuss the welfare implications. Section
4 looks at the bank￿s choice of home country and its ex-ante investment decision. In section 5,
some robustness checks are performed, and section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider an international bank operating in two countries,  and . The bank is incor-
porated in country ; i.e., country  is the ￿home country￿ whereas country  is the ￿host
country￿. The activities in country  are operated through a branch, so the oﬃces in the two
countries are jointly liable.
Before explaining the details of the model, it useful to sketch the timing. At time 0, the
bank collects deposits of 1 in each of the two countries. The deposits are invested in risky
and illiquid assets. At time 1, the supervisors observe a signal about the quality of the assets
located in their jurisdiction. The home country supervisor consults the host country supervisor
about the ￿nancial health of the branch in country B. That is, there is an information exchange
between the supervisors. Afterwards, the home country supervisor decides whether to close
the bank or to let it continue. If the bank is closed, all assets are liquidated. If the bank is
allowed to continue, the assets pay out at time 2. At this point in time, the depositors wish
to withdraw their funds. Therefore, the bank goes bankrupt if the return on the assets is not
enough to cover the withdrawals. The timing is illustrated below:
 =0  =1  =2
￿ consumers deposit
￿ bank invests in projects
￿ signals about assets received ()
￿ information exchange
￿ closure decision
￿ returns on projects realized
￿c o n s u m e r sw i t h d r a w
￿ possible bankruptcy
We start by analyzing to what extent voluntary cooperation between national supervisors
can achieve eﬃcient closure regulation. To focus on this aspect, in the next section we look
at the game starting from  =1where the bank￿s portfolio is given. In section 4, we discuss
how the equilibrium closure regulation aﬀects the bank￿s portfolio choice. In the following, we
explain the details of the model.
2.1 The bank
The ownership of the bank is divided among shareholders in country  and . Shareholders in
country  own a fraction  of the bank, and pro￿ts are split accordingly. It is for now assumed
that the bank collects deposits of size 1 in each country and invests them into a local project
The outline of the paper is as follows: In section 2 of the paper, we describe the model setup
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covered by a deposit insurance and receive no interests. Thus, they withdraw a total amount
of 2 at time 2.
If the bank is closed at time 1, the assets are liquidated prematurely. A project pays then ,
 ≤ 1. If the bank is allowed to continue, the return depends both on the quality of the portfolio
and the macroeconomic conditions. In country , there are ￿good times￿ with probability 
and ￿bad times￿ with probability 1 − . Each project consists of a ￿good￿ and a ￿bad￿ fraction.
T h eg o o df r a c t i o np a y s2 in good times and 1 in bad times per unit invested. The bad fraction
pays 1 in good times and 0 in bad times.
The fraction of good assets in country ,d e n o t e d,i su n c e r t a i n . is uniformly distributed
on [0	1],  = 	.W ea s s u m et h a t and  are independently distributed. The realization
of  is denoted , which we sometimes will refer to as the ￿type￿.  is thus a measure of the
quality of the assets in country .
We assume that the macro shocks are perfectly correlated across the two countries. With
probability , the bank experiences good times in both countries and with probability 1 − 
bad times.3 This assumption is adopted for simplicity, but is not crucial for the results.4 The
realization of the macro shock is not known until time 2 where the projects pay out. The pay-oﬀ
structure implies that the return is 2++ with probability  and + with probability
1 − , i.e. the bank is solvent in good times but not in bad times. It is assumed that  ≥ 1
2
so that the risky assets have a positive expected return.
2.2 The Supervisors
We take a political economy approach to closure regulation and assume that the supervisor in
country  maximizes the aggregate welfare of all parties located in country  and disregards
the welfare of agents in the foreign country. The depositors are not aﬀected by the success or
failure of the bank, because they are covered by a deposit insurance. The other parties aﬀected
by the performance of the bank are risk-neutral. Therefore, we assume that aggregate welfare
can be measured as the expected monetary pay-oﬀ to all agents in the country other than the
depositors.
A major assumption of the model is that the supervisors collect diﬀerent and complementary
information. Hence, there is a need for an information exchange between the home and the host
country supervisor, a point that has been stressed in the various BIS documents. We model this
by assuming that the supervisor in country  observes  but not  a n dv i c ev e r s a .W ep r e f e r
to think of  as ￿soft￿ information that only the local supervisor has access to. This could,
for example, be information about local borrowers or market conditions. However, if there are
3This can, for example, be thought of as a situation where the bank has specialized in an industry that is
strongly aﬀected by input or output prices on the world market.
4Were shocks only imperfectly correlated, it would depend on the realizations of  and  whether the bank
would fail if only one of the branches faced bad times. The analysis would not change qualitatively, but it would
not always be possible to solve the model in closed form.
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the bank￿s operations,  could contain both hard and soft information. Except from  and
, all other aspects of the game are common knowledge.5
In accordance with the principle of home country supervision, it is assumed that the home
country supervisor takes the closure decision. Before taking this decision, the home country
supervisor consults the supervisor in the host country. The timing is the following: First,
the supervisors in country  and  observe  and , respectively. Then, the host country
supervisor sends a signal about  to the home country supervisor. We have in mind a situation
where the home and the host country supervisor are sovereign and are not directly subject to
any international authority. Therefore, it is assumed that the signal sent by the host country
supervisor is costless, e.g., a written or an oral report, and it is not possible to use transfers
to elicit the supervisors￿ private information. As a benchmark for a welfare assessment, we use
the outcome when it is possible to set up a mechanism and use transfers to regulate closure.
We discuss the signalling game in more detail later. Finally, based on the available information
about  and , the home country supervisor decides whether to close the bank or to let it
continue.
2.3 Further assumptions
Deposit Insurance We assume that the deposit insurance company in the home country
covers a fraction  of the losses incurred by the depositors in country ,  ∈ [0	1].T h i s
allows us to encompass both a situation with and without home country deposit insurance.
The Bankruptcy Rule If the bank is closed or fails, the remaining assets are allocated
according to t h es i n g l ee n t i t ydoctrine. This implies that depositors in country  and  are
treated in the same way. As a bankruptcy rule, we assume that all depositors have the same
seniority and split the proceeds according to the deposited amount.
Systemic Eﬀect of Failure It makes a diﬀerence whether the bank is closed by the supervi-
sors or fails. If the bank fails unexpectedly, this may have serious systemic eﬀects. It could, for
example, lead to interruptions in the payment system, trigger a bank panic, or induce liquidity
shortages in other areas of the ￿nancial system. If, on the other hand, the bank is closed by the
supervisors, we assume that it is possible to liquidate the bank orderly and in such a way that
the systemic impact is minimized. As a normalization, we assume that a failure has a systemic
cost of  in country  whereas a closure has no systemic cost.
2.4 Derivation of the Supervisors￿ Preferences
In this section, we determine the (	 ) for which the supervisor in the home and in the
host country prefer the bank to be closed or to stay open. To this purpose, we determine a
5This implies, in particular, that both supervisors have access to aggregate information about the bank￿s
operations and know that one unit of deposits is collected and invested in each country.
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() that determines for each  the minimum value of  for which the supervisor
in country  prefers the bank to stay open. We will also sometimes use 
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Consider the home country supervisor ￿rst. The payoﬀs to local stakeholders are summa-
rized in Table 1 (depositors always obtain 1):
Table 1. The payoﬀs to home country stakeholders.
Home Country Deposit Insurance Systemic
Company Shareholders Cost
Open
- Success (prob. ) 0 ( + ) 0
- Failure (prob. (1 − )) −(1 + )(1 −
+
2 ) 0 − 
Close −(1 + )(1 − ) 0 0
If the bank is left open and times are good, the pro￿ts after having paid depositors, +,
are distributed to shareholders. If times are bad, the return  + is absorbed by the deposit
insurance company, who covers the remainder in order to pay back depositors. Additionally,
there is a systemic cost that arises from the unorderly closure of the bank. If, on the other
hand, the bank is closed beforehand, the project is liquidated yielding , which again goes to
the deposit insurance company.
A regulator thus faces the following trade-oﬀ: Bank closure implies foregoing the (possibly
high) returns from the projects if times are good. However, if the bank is left open and fails,
the home country has to incur the systemic cost of failure and might have to pay more to the
depositors in the host country.
A country￿s welfare is calculated as the expected sum of all local agents￿ pay-oﬀ.D e n o t eb y
∆ the gain of country  from leaving the bank open instead of closing it. From Table 1, it
is given by
∆(	 ) ≡ 
	
 (	 ) − 






−(1 + )(1 − )
The home country supervisor prefers to leave the bank in operation if and only if ∆(	 ) ≥
0,t h a ti s ,i f
 ≥ 

() ≡ {0	− } (1)
where  ≡ 2( +( 1+) − ( +1+))
((1 + )(1 − )+2 ).
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Table 2. The payoﬀs to host country stakeholders.
Host Country Deposit Insurance Systemic
Company Shareholders Cost
Open
- Success (prob. ) 0 (1 − )( + ) 0
- Failure (prob. (1 − )) −(1 − )(1 −
+
2 ) 0 − 
Close −(1 − )(1 − ) 0 0
The gain from leaving the bank open is
∆(	 ) ≡ 
	
 (	 ) − 

 
The host country supervisor prefers to leave the bank in operation if and only if
 ≥ 

() ≡ {0	− }	 (2)
where  ≡ 2((1 − ) +( 1− )( − ))
(1 +  − (1 − ) − 2)
There is in general no reason to expect that  =  such that the preferences of the home
and host country coincide perfectly. We will thus analyze the game and derive the equilibrium
for any combination of  and .F o rs p e c i ￿cv a l u e so f(	 	 			 ) it is then possible
to calculate  and  and ￿nd the equilibrium outcome. We will impose the following restriction
on  and :
Assumption 1 	 ≤ 1.
This assumption serves primarily an expositional purpose, as it reduces the number of
diﬀerent cases that we need to consider in the text.6
Figure 1 displays an example of the supervisors￿ preferences for  . The solid lines
indicate the supervisors￿ indiﬀerence curves. That is, combinations of (	 ) such that the
supervisor is indiﬀerent between leaving the bank open or closing it, i.e. ∆(	 )=0 .F o r
high expected returns,  +   , the supervisors prefer to leave the bank open. Similarly,
for low returns,  +   , they prefer to close it. In the region   +   ,t h e
supervisors do not agree which action to take. The host country supervisor prefers to close the
bank whereas the home country supervisor prefers to keep it open. This region of disagreement
plays a crucial role in the later analysis as it impedes the ￿ow of information between the
supervisors.
We would like to add one remark on the supervisors￿ objective functions: In this analysis,
we assume that supervisors care about the well-being of all stakeholders of the bank that are
6Since  and  are independently and uniformly distributed on [01], ( +)=1 . Hence, as  ≤ 1,
the supervisors would prefer to leave the bank open if no additional information about  and  became
available. The parameter restriction  ≤ 1 can thus be interpreted as the supervisors having a ￿positive prior￿
about the state of the bank.
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Figure 1: The preferences of the supervisors in country A and in country B. Closure is preferred








represents the ￿rst best closure rule.
located in their own country. However, the statutes of diﬀerent supervisory agencies quite diﬀer
in their objective functions: Some supervisors care primarily about depositor protection, while
others have the mandate to protect a larger group of aﬀected parties.7 It is easy to see, however,
that changing the supervisors￿ objective functions would have no qualitative consequences for
our analysis, as long as the realized returns  and  matter for at least one of the stakeholders.





()=−, but with  and  possibly diﬀerent from  and . This would not change
the derivation of the equilibrium but would of course impact on the welfare analysis.
3S o l v i n g t h e G a m e
In this section we analyze the equilibrium of the game set out above. As a benchmark we
start by determining the optimal closure rule when the supervisors can use a mechanism with
sidepayments to regulate closure. We then continue with the full model where no mechanism can
be used and derive the endogenous communication between the supervisors and the resulting
closure regulation.
7For example, one aim of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) of the UK is the protection of depositors.
Contrarily, the German supervisory authority is obliged to care about risk that may aﬀect the return to any in-
vestment made in the bank, hence it encompasses both deposits and shareholdings. Also, while some institutions
care only about direct stakeholders of the banks being supervised, others such as the Oﬃce of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC) in the US explicitly mention the safety of the banking system as a whole as an objective,
so clearly care about systemic consequences.
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The ￿rst best closure rule is de￿ned as the one that maximizes the joint welfare of the two
countries. Abusing notation slightly, we denote it 


 (•), and it indicates the minimal value of
 for which the bank should stay open as a function of . 













 () ≡ {0	( + )(1 − )+2 (  − ) − } (3)
T h ed o t t e dl i n ei n￿gure 1 represents 


 (•).S i n c e 


 (•) takes into account the welfare of





The following remark will be useful in the later analysis:
Remark 1 If  =  = ,  =1 
2,a n d =0 , the preferences of the supervisors
coincide ( = ) and are identical to the ￿rst best closure rule. The degree of disalignment of
i n t e r e s t sa sm e a s u r e db y{	}
{	} is increasing in  whereas the ￿r s tb e s tc l o s u r e
rule is unaﬀected.
Proof. In appendix. ¥
We de￿ne second best closure as a situation where the supervisors have private information
about the activities of the bank in their country, but they can agree ex-ante on implementing




is also the second best closure rule, because it maximizes total surplus and is implementable if
sidepayments can be used.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the supervisors have private information about the activities of
the bank in their country. If the supervisors can regulate closure using a mechanism with




Proof. In appendix. ¥
In the proof it is shown that the preferences of the supervisors satisfy the single crossing
condition (-) with respect to the closure rule. It follows then from a standard result in the
mechanism design literature that 


 (•) is implementable under asymmetric information as it
is decreasing.
3.2 Equilibrium Closure Regulation
We now turn to the analysis of the full model where there is no possibility to set up a mechanism
to regulate closure. The signal that the host country supervisor sends is costless (￿cheap talk￿)
and has real eﬀects only to the extent that it is believed by the home country supervisor and
changes the closure decision. Solving the game, we draw on the pioneering work by Crawford
and Sobel (1982). Crawford and Sobel consider a game where a sender with private information
signals to an uninformed receiver. Here, the game is diﬀerent, as both the sender (the host
16
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It might therefore seem restrictive that we only allow the host country supervisor to signal the
type. We show in section 5.2 that this is not necessarily the case: Any equilibrium closure
regulation that can be sustained when both parties send signals and that depends only on the
realized types can also be sustained if only the host country supervisor signals the type. To keep
the presentation as simple as possible, we have chosen to let only the host country supervisor
signal the type.
In the sequel, we solve the game backwards. First, we derive the closure rule of the home
country supervisor. This rule indicates, as a function of the signal sent by the host country
supervisor and , whether the bank is closed or allowed to continue. After that we derive the
signalling rule of the supervisor. This rule determines the signal send as a function of .I n
equilibrium, the signalling and the closure rule are optimal taking the other rule as given.
The closure rule follows immediately from the analysis in the previous section. Suppose that
the host country supervisor sends the signal .D e n o t eb y( | ) the expected type given
the signal . The closure decision of the home country supervisor is then given as:
(	)=





Close the bank if  
 
(). (4)
We now derive the signalling rule of the host country supervisor. Invoking the revelation
principle, we focus on incentive compatible signalling rules. Without loss of insight, we make
the following assumption:
Assumption 2 There do not exist two signals, 0 and 00 that are both played in equilibrium
with positive probability such that either ( | 0)=( | 00) or ( | 0)	( |
00) ≥ .
Assumption 2 implies that in equilibrium there will not be used two signals that lead to the
same closure decision for all . The host country supervisor thus uses the minimal number of
diﬀerent signals necessary to sustain a given equilibrium.8
As mentioned above, the model satis￿es the single crossing condition (-), which allows for
an equilibrium with (imperfectly) informative signalling. We are ready to derive the signalling
rule. As a ￿rst step, we show that the host country supervisor only uses a ￿nite number of
signals in equilibrium. The proof of this lemma follows Crawford and Sobel quite closely and
has been left out. Details are available upon request.
Lemma 1 If  6= , the host country supervisor uses a ￿nite number of signals in equilibrium.
Proof. See Crawford and Sobel (1982), Lemma 1. ¥
8Consider an equilibrium where ( | 0)=( | 00) or ( | 0), ( | 00) ≥ . This equilibrium
outcome could clearly be sustained without the signal 0 (or 00). All types sending the signal 0 would then
simply send the signal 00 instead. Assumption A.2. eliminates signals, which are super￿uous in this way.
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}. Instead of revealing the type, the host country supervisor only
reveals the interval to which  belongs. Thus, the information that it transmits is less detailed
than possible. Since the interests of the two countries do not perfectly coincide, this is the
only way in which the host country supervisor can (credibly) transmit information to the home
country supervisor. In equilibrium, the same signal is sent for all types belonging to a given
interval.
Lemma 2 The signalling rule used by the host country supervisor has the following form:







()=1 , and 
−1
 ()  
().
ii) The host country supervisor signals the interval to which  belongs.










() =0  (5)
Proof. Consider part ). Suppose that there exist two signals, 0 and 00, such that ( |




(0).S u p p o s e t h a t
in equilibrium there exist two types, 0
 and 
00
,s u c ht h a t
0
 sends the signal 0 and 
00
 sends
the signal 00. Incentive compatibility requires that the type 0





































 ≤ 0 (ICC 0
)
Similarly, the incentive constraint of a 00









 ≥ 0 (ICC 00
)
A necessary condition for the two incentive compatibility constraints to be satis￿ed simultane-
ously is 0
  00
. This implies together with Lemma 1 part ) and ) of the lemma. Since
∆(	 ) is continuous, incentive compatibility requires that the host country supervisor is
indiﬀerent between signalling 
 and 
+1
 if  = 
().T h i si m p l i e st h a t( 5 )h o l d s .F u r t h e r -







 ), (5) is enough to ensure
that no types in 
 will deviate and signal 
+1
 (and vice versa). An analogous argument
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signals, there is a ￿babbling equilibrium￿ where the signal that the host country supervisor
sends contains no information on the type and is ignored by the home country supervisor. The
next proposition characterizes the equilibria where the host country supervisor reveals some
information about the activities of the branch in country .
Proposition 2 Characterization of the equilibria with information exchange.
Equilibrium of type 1 with n intervals:





 +(  − )(22 − ( + 1)(2 − 1)) .
ii) After receiving the signal 







 − ( − )(22 − ( −  + 1)(2 − 1)) .
Equilibrium of type 2 with n intervals:
i) The host country supervisor follows the signalling rule described in Lemma 2 with





ii) After receiving the signal 








Proof. Consider an equilibrium where the host country supervisor uses  intervals to signal
the type. Using Lemma 2, 0
()=0 ,a n d	
()=1 , we obtain a linear system of  − 1









() =0for  =1 		− 1	
where 







2}.T h i s s y s t e m
of equations determines {1
()		
	−1




)=0and the ones of type 2 by 

(	
)  0. The closure decision is as described in










 ).I t c a n b e v e r i ￿ed that the

() and 
() de￿ned in the proposition satisfy all the above conditions. Finally, since the
signalling rule satis￿es the conditions in Lemma 2 and the closure decision follows (4), it is a
Nash equilibrium. ¥
Figure 2 illustrates equilibria of type 1 and 2 with 2 intervals. The diﬀerence between the
two types of equilibria is that the bank is always closed for low values of  in the equilibrium
of type 2 but not in the equilibrium of type 1. Here, the bank is allowed to continue if the host
country supervisor signals that the expected return on the assets in country B is high.
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Figure 2: An equilibrium of type 1 (left) and type 2 (right) where the host country supervisor
uses two intervals to signal the type of the host country branch.
To understand how an equilibrium works, consider the equilibrium of type 1 illustrated in
￿gure 3. The host country supervisor partitions here the types into two intervals, 1
 and 2
.
The bank is closed if the host country supervisor signals 1
 and  ≤ 1
(2). We solve the game
backwards, and look ￿rst at the closure rule of the home country supervisor. Suppose that the
home country supervisor has received the signal 2
.S i n c e( | 2
)  , it is optimal to leave
the bank open for all . Suppose instead that the signal was 1
. Notice that in equilibrium
1
(2)+( | 1
)=. Hence, after receiving the signal 1
, the home country supervisor closes
the bank if and only if  ≤ 1
(2). The closure rule is therefore optimal given the signalling
rule used by the host country supervisor.
Let￿s now turn to the signalling rule. If   1
(2), the bank stays open both when the
signal is 1
 and 2
, so the signal does not matter. However, if  ≤ 1
(2),i tm a k e sad i ﬀerence.
The bank is then allowed to continue if and only if the host country supervisor signals that 
belongs to the interval with the high types, 2
. The host country supervisor thus decides which
signal to send conditional on  ≤ 1
(2). The equilibrium is constructed such that if  ∈ 1

( ∈ 
2 ) the host country supervisor prefers the bank to be closed (to stay open) conditional
on  ≤ 1
(2). This can be seen from the ￿gure where 1
(2) + ( |  ≤ 1
(2)) = .
Therefore, the host country supervisor truthfully signals the interval. The closure and the
signalling rule constitute an equilibrium, because they are optimal taking the other rule as
given. All other equilibria are constructed in a similar manner.
The next proposition gives the conditions under which the candidate equilibria exist.
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Figure 3: An equilibrium of type 1 with two intervals.
Proposition 3 Existence of equilibria with information exchange.
There exists an equilibrium of type 1 with  intervals if and only if

2( − 1)2
2( − 1)2 − 1
, (6)

2( − 1)2 − 1




















Proof. See appendix. ¥
A number of results follow immediately from the conditions in Proposition 3. Conditions
(8) and (9) imply that an equilibrium of type 1 and 2 with  intervals do not coexist. We will
thus simply refer to a  interval equilibrium when it does not matter whether it is of type 1 or
2.
Corollary 1 If there exists an equilibrium where the host country supervisor uses  intervals
to signal the type, then there also exists an equilibrium where it uses  intervals,  .
Proof. See appendix. ¥
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neither does an equilibrium with more than two intervals exist. This gives an upper bound
on how disaligned the interests of the supervisors can be and still allow for the information
exchange to impact on the closure decision.
Corollary 2 The closure decision is not in￿uenced by the information send by the host country
supervisor if 2 or { − 1
4	 
2}  .
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 3 with  =2  ¥
Finally, we derive two additional results that are useful in the later analysis.
Corollary 3 i) An equilibrium of type 1 with  intervals and an equilibrium of type 2 with
 +1intervals,  ≥ 2, cannot coexist.
ii) If  ≥ , the equilibrium with the highest number of intervals is of type 1.
Proof. In appendix. ¥
3.3 Welfare Analysis
The ￿rst thing to notice is that if the supervisors have somewhat con￿icting interests ( 6= ),
it is not possible to implement the ￿rst best closure regulation. Compared to the ￿rst best
closure rule, the bank risks being closed when it shouldn￿t be and may stay open when closing
it would be better. To put it diﬀerently, the home country supervisor will commit both errors
of ￿type I￿ and ￿type II￿. Figure 4 illustrates this point. Indeed, the equilibrium is constructed
such a way that the bank is closed for some (	 ) for which  +    {	},a n dl e f t
open for some (	 ) for which  +     {	}. The bank is thus closed in situations
w h e r eb o t hs u p e r v i s o r sw o u l dp r e f e ri tt os t a yo p e na n dv i c ev e r s a .
The next proposition shows that the home and the host country supervisor have an interest in
coordinating on the equilibrium with the highest possible number of intervals. The intuition for
this result is that in an equilibrium where the host country supervisor partitions the information
￿ner, it is possible to approximate the preferences of the supervisors better.
Proposition 4 The expected welfare of the home and the host country are for given  and 
increasing in the number of intervals used in equilibrium.
Proof. In appendix. ¥
Another factor that is crucial for the quality of the information exchange is the degree of
disalignment of the supervisors￿ preferences. To isolate the eﬀect due to alignment, we do the
following exercise: We start from the benchmark case of Remark 1 where  =  = ,
 =1 
2,a n d =0so that preferences of the supervisors coincide ( = ). We then
consider the eﬀect of increasing . The interests get more disaligned as  increases, whereas
our benchmark, the ￿rst best closure rule, is unaﬀected. This exercise allows us to determine
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Figure 4: Compared to the ￿rst best outcome, any equilibrium with information exchange can
lead to too little closure (type I error) or too much closure (type II error).
how the degree of alignment aﬀects the eﬃciency of closure regulation relative to a constant
benchmark.
We ￿rst show that for a given equilibrium, more disaligned interests lead to a lower joint
welfare of the two countries.
Lemma 3 For any given equilibrium either of type 1 or 2 with  intervals, the total expected
welfare is decreasing in the degree of disalignment of interests.
Proof. In appendix. ¥
Using Lemma 3 and Proposition 4, we show that total expected welfare decreases as the
interests of the supervisors get more disaligned, i.e. as  increases.9
Proposition 5 Assuming that the supervisors coordinate on the equilibrium with highest pos-
sible number of intervals, total expected welfare is decreasing in the disalignment of interests.
Proof. In appendix ¥
It is important to notice that it is total welfare of the two countries that decreases. It is
possible that the welfare of the host country increases as the deposit insurance company of the
home country covers a larger share of the losses in the host country. This increase, however, is
more than oﬀset by a decrease in the home country￿s welfare.





Working Paper Series No. 316
March 20044 Regulatory Arbitrage
Up to now, the bank has played a rather passive role in the analysis. It has collected deposits
and invested them, but it has not taken any strategic decisions. In this section, we analyze
diﬀerent ways that the bank can exploit the con￿ict of interests among the supervisors to reduce
the probability of closure and increase pro￿ts.
4.1 Endogenous Choice of Investment Location
We show ￿rst how the bank has an incentive to allocate its investments strategically across the
two countries in order to exploit the disagreement among the supervisors. There are, of course,
many factors that aﬀect the decision of a multinational bank where to invest. The investment
climate may, for example, be better in one country than in another.10 The bank may also
spread investments across countries to diversify its portfolio or even concentrate investments
in certain countries or regions to increase risk-taking.11 Here, we want to abstract from these
issues and isolate the eﬀect due to the disagreement among supervisors when to close the bank.
We will consider the following variation of the base line model. Investment projects come
in the size of 1 and have the pay-oﬀ described above. However, the bank can now choose either
to invest one unit in each of the countries or two units in only one country. If the bank invests
everything in country  or , the local supervisor has an informational monopoly concerning
the quality of the bank￿s assets. The superior information will be used to further the interests
of the supervisor￿s own country. If the bank instead invests in both countries, everything is as
in the base model and the previous analysis applies. To save on notation, the good fraction of
the two projects are again denoted  and  no matter where the projects are invested. That
i s ,e v e nw h e nb o t hp r o j e c t sa r ei n v e s t e di n ,s a y ,c o u n t r y so that the home country supervisor
obtains signals about both projects, the good fractions are denoted  and .
We consider the bank￿s pro￿t maximizing investment as a function of the degree of dis-
alignment of interests, {	}
{	}. In the analysis, we focus on the case so
that country  is more lenient. We will use the following notation: Π20(	) and Π02(	)
are the pro￿t of the bank, as a function of  and , if everything is invested in country 
and in country , respectively. If the bank invests one unit in each country, pro￿t is denoted
Π11(		) and is a function of 	, and the number of intervals used in equilibrium, .W e
assume that the supervisors are able to maximize welfare by coordinating on the equilibrium
with the highest number of intervals.
Suppose ￿rst that the bank invests everything in the home country. The home country
supervisor does not need to consult the host country supervisor, as it has all the available
information about the solvency of the bank. The home country supervisor closes the bank if
10Indeed, one of the intrinsic advantages of multinational banks is the possibility of funneling funds to regions
where the expected return is highest.
11It is well-known that banks may have an incentive to choose too risky a portfolio due to limited liability. This
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Suppose now instead that the bank invests everything in the host country. The host country
supervisor observes (	 ) and can decide how much information to reveal to the home country
supervisor. Information exchange is relevant if there exists an equilibrium such that (at least)
t w oo ft h es i g n a l su s e di ne q u i l i b r i u ml e a dt oad i ﬀe r e n tc l o s u r ed e c i s i o n .I ns u c ha ne q u i l i b r i u m
it has to hold that the bank is closed in equilibrium if and only if  +  ≤ .O t h e r w i s e ,
the host country would for some (	 ) have an incentive to deviate and send the signal that
implements its preferred closure decision. The candidate equilibrium is thus one where the host
country supervisor sends the signal 1
 if  +  ≤  and the signal 2
 if  +   .T h e
closure rule is such that the bank is closed if the signal is 1
 a n dl e f to p e no t h e r w i s e .
To check whether this is indeed an equilibrium, we need to consider the home country
supervisor￿s optimal closure decision. Whenever the signal is 2
, the home country supervisor
leaves the bank open as  . However, if the signal is 1
, it only closes the bank if (+ |

1 )=
2 ≤ . Therefore, the candidate equilibrium is sustainable if and only if  ≤ 2.F o r
2 the interests are so disaligned that communication between the supervisors breaks down.
Since ( + )=1 , the bank is never closed, which, of course, makes investing in the
host country a very attractive option. The expected pro￿t of the bank is:





The host country supervisor is able to achieve its preferred closure decision for 2,a si t
has private information about  and . Using the terminology of Aghion and Tirole (1997),
the host country supervisor has ￿real authority￿ over the closure decision even if it is the home
country supervisor that has the ￿formal authority￿.
Finally, if the bank decides to invest in both countries, the analysis of the base line model
applies. We assume that the supervisors coordinate on the equilibrium with the highest possible
number of intervals. Since  ≥ , this is an equilibrium of type 1, see Corollary (3). Using
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ing equilibrium. There exists a 
 ∈ ((1 +
√
3)
2	2) such that the bank￿s pro￿t as a function
of 
 satis￿es the following conditions:
Π20(	)   {Π11(		)	Π02(	)} for 
 ≤ 
	
Π11(		)  Π20(	)  Π02(	) for 
  
  2	
Π02(	)=Π11(		)  Π20(	) for 
 ≥ 2
Proof. In appendix. ¥
The bank￿s pro￿t-maximizing investment strategy shows an interesting pattern. For  and
 relatively close (1 ≤ 
  
), the bank chooses to invest everything in the home country.
The bank does here regulatory arbitrage by investing in the country where the supervisor is
less inclined to close the bank. As the distance between  and  gets larger (
 ≤ 
  2)),
the bank exploits the fact that the communication between the supervisors works poorly due
to their disaligned interests. Therefore, it invests in both countries to reduce the probability of
being closed. Finally, for 
  2, the host country supervisor cannot transmit any information
to the home country supervisor. The bank invests in the host country and avoids closure
altogether.
A few simple calculations can illustrate how the probability of closure indeed changes with
the investment decision and 
. Denote the probability that the banks is closed by (•) where




3 for  ≤ 2	
0 otherwise.
Using Proposition 3 and disregarding integer constraints, the maximal number of intervals can
be written as:





















(2 − )( + )
6 for  ≤ 2	
0 otherwise.
Comparing the probabilities of closure shows that i) 11(	)  (=)02() for all 
  (≥
)2 and ii) 11(	) ≥ 20() ⇐⇒ 
 ≤ (1 +
√
7)
3. The investment decision described in
Proposition 6 is thus roughly the one that minimizes the probability that the bank is closed.
However, the probability of closure does not alone determine the investment choice. For a given
probability of closure, the pro￿t is lower when the bank invests in both countries, because the
supervisors will commit type I and type II errors when deciding on closure. This explains why
the bank invests two units in the home country for 
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
 the expected welfare in country  for the bank￿s investment allocation .
Proposition 7 Suppose that  ≥  and that the supervisors coordinate on the welfare maxi-






















 is de￿ned as in Proposition 6.
ii) 
 ≥ 2: 20
   {02
 	11
 } for  = {	}.
Proof. In appendix. ¥
Proposition 7 states that when the supervisor￿s interests are rather close (
  2), each
supervisor would prefer the bank to invest both projects in its own country, because it then can
implement its most preferred closure decision. Moreover, the host country supervisor prefers
investment in the home country only to investment in both countries. On the other hand, if the
divergence of interests is large (
 ≥ 2) both supervisors prefer the bank to invest everything
in country A to ensure closure when the quality of the assets is low (recall that in this case, no
information exchange is possible).
Comparing the investment decision of the bank with the supervisors￿ preferences, we ￿nd
the following: for 
 ≤ 
 the bank invests everything in the home country, which does not
run counter to interests of the supervisors. The host country supervisor would have preferred
that the bank had invested two units in the host country, but two units in the home country
is preferred to one unit in each country. For 
  
, it is optimal for the bank to invest one
unit in each country. This decision is suboptimal from point of view of welfare. Indeed, the
welfare of both countries would have been higher had the bank invested two units in the home
country. Our analysis suggests therefore that strategic investment by the bank is more likely
have adverse welfare eﬀects when there is a serious con￿ict of interests between the home and
the host country.
The results in Proposition 7 provide a nice link to recent work by Dessein (2002) that extends
on Crawford and Sobel (1982). In the model by Crawford and Sobel there is a principal that
takes a decision based on the signal that an agent sends. Dessein shows that it may be optimal
for the principal simply to delegate the decision right to the agent. The agent, of course, takes
the decision that serves her interests best. Still, this might be better for the principal than
taking his ￿rst best decision based on an imprecise signal. It is shown that the more aligned
the interests of the principal and the agent are, the more attractive is delegation. The intuition
is that if the interests of the parties are close, more information is revealed in absolute terms
(i.e. more intervals can used be in equilibrium), but less information is revealed relative to the
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agent￿s signal becomes worse relative to the decision that the agent would take herself.
Let us reconsider our model in the light of the analysis by Dessein. Suppose that 
 ≤ 2.I f
the bank invests in both countries, the home country supervisor has to take the closure decision
based on an imprecise signal from the host country supervisor. On the other hand, if the bank
invests two units in one country, the closure decision is essentially delegated to the supervisor
in the country that receives the investment. The decision based on communication becomes
worse relative to delegation as  and  come closer. This can be seen in the following way:
De￿n et h ed e g r e eo fc o n ￿ict of interests as  − .12 Then, disregarding integer constraints and
using (14), the average size of an interval is 1
max(	).W ec a nn o wd e ￿ne the average size of
an interval relative to the degree of con￿ict as a measure of how well the communication works
relative to delegation. It is easy to show that 1
	max()(−) is strictly decreasing in ( − ):
Less information gets revealed relative to the con￿ict of interests as interests get more aligned.
Delegating the closure decision to the foreign country is more attractive for the host than for
the home country, because it is the home country that has to give up authority. Therefore, the
host country supervisor prefers that the bank invests everything in the foreign country rather
than spreading investments for all 
 ≤ 2 whereas the home country supervisor only prefers
this if  and  are suﬃciently close.
4.2 Endogenous Choice of Home Country
In our base line model country  was the home and country  the host country. The historical
origins of the bank often determines, which country is assigned the role as home country.
However, the bank can often decide where to register its headquarters, so the home country
should be seen as a strategic choice. Luxembourg, for example, was the home country of BCCI
despite that most of BCCI￿s business was operated out of London.
In the following we extend the previous analysis by allowing the bank to choose the home
country. We consider a US type of system without home country deposit insurance. This keeps
the analysis tractable, because the preferences of the two countries do not change with the
role as home or host country. We will assume that ≤ 2. T h i si m p l i e st h a tc o u n t r y
is more inclined to close the bank than country  and that an equilibrium with at least two
i n t e r v a l se x i s t sw h e nc o u n t r y is home country, see Proposition 3. It will be assumed that the
supervisors coordinate on the welfare maximizing equilibrium.
Figure 5 illustrates how the equilibrium changes depending on whether country  or  is
home country. Suppose ￿r s tt h a tc o u n t r y is the home country. This is the graph to the right





2( − 1)2 − 1
 for some  ≥ 2. (15)
12We could instead have de￿ned it as  − 1, which would not have changed the results.
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Figure 5: The graph to the left illustrates a situation where country  is home country. There
are here three regions where diﬀerent kinds of equilibria can be sustained, see text. The graph
to the right illustrates a situation where country  is home country. The supervisors will here
coordinate on an equilibrium of type 1 with  intervals. The lines in both graphs are drawn for
 =2 .
It follows then from Corollary 3 and Proposition 4 that the supervisors will coordinate on an
equilibrium of type 1 with  intervals.
Suppose instead that country  is home country. This is illustrated in the graph to the
left in ￿gure 5. Switching the role of  and  in Proposition 3,13 we ￿nd that there exist three
regions with diﬀerent kinds of equilibria:
Region I: For  ≥ 	
	−1− 2	−1
2	(	−1), the supervisors coordinate on an equilibrium of type 1 with
 intervals.
Region II: For  ≤  − 1
2	(	−1), the supervisors coordinate on an equilibrium of type 2 with
 − 1 intervals.
Region III: For  	
	−1 − 2	−1
2	(	−1) and − 1
2	(	−1), the supervisors coordinate on an
equilibrium of type 2 with  intervals.
The three regions are shown in ￿gure 5. This completes the description of the equilibrium
closure regulation conditional on the choice of home country.
We turn now to the bank￿s choice of home country. Consider ￿rst a combination of  and
 such that (	) belongs to region I. The triangle in ￿gure 5 illustrates one such (	). Here,
there will be an equilibrium of type 1 with  intervals both when country  and  is the home
country, and it is shown below that the bank is indiﬀerent with respect to the home country.
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region III, because the kind of equilibrium that can be sustained changes. The equilibrium is
of type 1 (with  intervals) if country  is home country and of type 2 (with −1 intervals in
region II and  intervals in region III) if country  is home country. The circle and the square
in ￿gure 5 illustrate a (	) that belongs to region II and III, respectively. The next proposition
derives the bank￿s optimal choice of home country:
Proposition 8 Consider the three regions illustrated in ￿gure 5. For (b,a) belonging to region
I, the bank is indiﬀerent between having country A or B as home country. For (b,a) belonging
to region II or III, the bank prefers country A, the more lenient country, as the home country.
Proof. See appendix. ¥
Proposition 8 shows that the bank has an interest in choosing the country that is least
inclined to close it as home country. The result is intuitive, but the underlying argument is
subtle as it relies on the type of equilibrium that can be sustained in the information exchange.
The next proposition looks at the welfare consequences of the bank￿s choice.
Proposition 9 Consider the three regions illustrated in ￿gure 5. For (b,a) belonging to region
I, the joint welfare of the two countries is independent of whether country A or B is the home
country. For (b,a) belonging to region II or III, a suﬃcient condition for the joint welfare to be




 (0) ≤ ( + )
2. (16)
Proof. See appendix. ¥
If condition (16) is satis￿ed, the bank￿s choice of home country maximizes the joint welfare
of the two countries. This condition has the interpretation that country A￿s preferences are
closer to the ￿rst best preferences than country B￿s. If condition (16) does not hold, there will
be combinations of  and  where the bank￿s choice is welfare maximizing and others where it
is not. Notice also that condition (16) is satis￿ed in the numerical example considered in ￿gure
1 .T h ec h o i c eo fh o m ec o u n t r ym a yt h u sb ei nc o n ￿ict with overall welfare but it needs not be.
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5.1 Reputation and Cooperation
The supervisors in our model interact only once. This keeps the analysis tractable, but excludes
reputation concerns as a mechanism to increase cooperation. A complete analysis of reputation
and cooperation in our cheap talk environment is outside the scope of this paper, but we will
develop an example that illustrates some of the additional issues that arise in a dynamic context.
Derivations have been left out but are available upon request.
Suppose that the game considered in section 3 is repeated every period for an in￿nite number
of periods. The types are independently distributed across periods. The discount factor between
periods is . To keep things simple, it is assumed that if the bank is closed, an identical (but
diﬀerent) bank starts the following period. Therefore, the supervisors do not destroy future
investment opportunities by closing the bank.
We will consider an example where the host country supervisor signals the true type, .
The home country supervisor decides to close the bank iﬀ.  +   .A f t e r t h e c l o s u r e
decision has been made, but before the next period, the home country supervisor performs
an audit that reveals whether the host country supervisor signalled the true type. If yes, the
supervisors continue to play this equilibrium in the next period. However, if the host country
supervisor lied, they revert to a static Nash equilibrium forever. We assume that 28
7
and that the supervisors play the two interval equilibrium following a deviation.
The ￿rst thing to notice is that only the host country supervisor can have an incentive to
deviate. Indeed, assuming that the home country supervisor believes that the true type has
been revealed, the signal that maximizes the host country￿s expected welfare in the current
period is  = {0	  − ( − )}. The host country supervisor adjusts thus the signal for
the diﬀerence in preferences. Compared to signalling the true type, the welfare of the host




2	 ) ≥ 0 for  ≤  − 
−( − )∆(( + )
2 − 	 )  0 for  −   ≤ 
−( − )∆(( − )
2	 ) ≥ 0 for   ≤ 
0 otherwise,
which is maximized for  −   ≤ .
However, lying is costly. We show in the proof of Proposition 8 that the two interval
equilibrium gives a lower expected welfare for the host country than closing the bank for all
 +  .D e n o t eb y∆

 the expected welfare gain (i.e. before  is known) from







992 − 962 +3 2 3 − 343  0,
where Ψ is a positive constant. A lie destroys the host country supervisor￿s reputation for telling
the truth. As a result, the supervisors revert to the two interval equilibrium where the host
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

in all future periods.
The host country supervisor compares current bene￿t and future costs of lying when sig-












 ( = ) ⇔
 ≥
∆
 ( = )
∆




The equilibrium is sustainable if the discount rate is suﬃciently close to 1. The relevant discount
rate will depend on a number of factors including how frequently the supervisors interact (see,
e.g. Cabral, 2000). It is easier to sustain cooperation among supervisors that work together
regularly, because a deviation will be punished sooner. Similarly, it has been shown that
collaboration on several issues (say, in the supervision of more than one multinational bank)
facilitates cooperation, see Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
The equilibrium described above is not the only one possible. Another possibility would
be that the host country supervisor reveals the true type, but the home country supervisor
closes the bank iﬀ.  +  for some  ∈ (	]. This would make cooperation by the
host country supervisor easier to sustain, because ∆

 would increase and ∆

decrease. On the other hand, the home country supervisor would sometimes need to close the
bank for  +   , which would introduce an additional incentive constraint. One problem
of sustaining such an equilibrium is that the host country supervisor usually does not have
access to the books of the mother bank in the home country. The host country supervisor may
therefore have a hard time observing  and knowing whether the home country supervisor has
cheated the agreement.14
5.2 More General Cheap Talk Games
The diﬀerence between a mechanism and a cheap talk game is that signals are binding in a
mechanism but not in a cheap talk game. In particular, after the supervisors have sent their
signals, the mechanism decides whether the bank is closed or not. However, in a cheap talk
game, the home country supervisor decides whether to close the bank after having received the
signal(s) send by the host country supervisor.
Clearly, any equilibrium in a cheap talk game can be implemented using a direct mechanism
with no sidepayments.15 However, the opposite is not true. In the main text, only the host
14If monitoring the agreement is diﬃcult, cooperation becomes harder to sustain. Still, cooperation is in some
circumstances possible even with imperfect monitoring; see, e.g., Green and Porter (1984).
15Consider an equilibrium in the cheap talk game. Suppose that the supervisors in country 
 and  play the
strategies ∗
() and ∗
(), respectively. The mechanism designer essentially promises to play these strategies
for the supervisors. Formally: Denote by (( )( )) the expected welfare of country  as a function
of the strategies played and the types. The direct mechanism has the payoﬀ (( ∗
())( ∗
())) for
country  as a function of the signals send,  and ,a n dt h et r u et y p e s and .T a k e ,f o re x a m p l e ,t h e
home country supervisor. Since (∗
() ∗
()) constitute a Nash equilibrium in the cheap talk game, we have
that (( ∗
())( ∗
())) ≥ (( )( ∗
())) for any possible strategy .T h i si m p l i e s
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equilibrium outcomes by considering more general cheap talk games where, for example, both
supervisors signal the type. We show this result for all equilibria such that the equilibrium
outcome is deterministic once the types are realized. We will refer to this class of equilibria as
￿deterministic equilibria￿.
The method of proof is the following: First, we derive the set of incentive compatible
mechanisms without sidepayments. Afterwards, we ￿nd necessary conditions for an outcome
induced by such a mechanism to be sustainable as an equilibrium of a cheap talk game. Finally,
we show that if the necessary conditions are satis￿ed, the outcome of the mechanism can be
sustained as an equilibrium of the simple cheap talk game considered in the text. The necessary
conditions are thus also suﬃcient. Furthermore, as long as we restrict attention to deterministic
equilibria, it would not expand the set of equilibrium outcomes to consider more general cheap
talk games.
Proposition 10 Consider the class of deterministic equilibria. Then, the equilibrium outcome
of any cheap talk game can also be sustained as an equilibrium outcome of the simple cheap talk
game analyzed in section 3.
Proof. See appendix. ¥
We would like to point out that the restriction to deterministic equilibria is not necessarily
innocuous. In recent work on cheap talk games where only the sender has private information,
Aumann and Hart (2003) and Krishna and Morgan (2003) have shown that it can lead to a
Pareto improvement to break the deterministic link between types and equilibrium outcomes.16
Whether and when this is also the case in games like ours where both the sender and the receiver
have private information is an interesting topic for future research.
in particular that (( ∗
())( ∗




 6= . Therefore,
it is a Nash equilibrium for both supervisors to reveal their types truthfully.
16Krishna and Morgan, for example, introduces a stage with face-to-face communication in the model by
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This paper studies con￿icts of interests in the supervision of multinational banks. We analyze
a situation in which national supervisors have complementary information about the assets of
a multinational bank. Taking a political economy approach, it is assumed that the supervisors
act in the interest of their respective local economies, but do not care about welfare in other
countries. Under this assumption, we study their incentives to exchange information before
deciding upon the possible closure of the bank.
The information exchange is modelled as a cheap talk game. Since the supervisors do not
always agree on the closure decision, they do not reveal as detailed information as they could.
This has several implications. First, the ￿rst best closure regulation can never be reached.
Second, the better aligned the interests of the countries are, the more detailed information can
be exchanged in equilibrium. The joint welfare of the two countries depends thus negatively on
the divergence of interests. We also analyze how the bank￿s investment decision is in￿uenced by
the equilibrium closure regulation. It is found that the bank can allocate its assets strategically
across countries to reduce the probability of closure. That is, the supervisors￿ inability to
exchange detailed information creates regulatory slack that the bank can exploit.
Several documents by the Bank for International Settlements emphasize that prudent su-
pervision of multinational banks requires close cooperation and information exchange among
national supervisors. However, this paper suggests that even if the appropriate (formal) chan-
nels for the exchange of information are in place, the current regulatory framework might not
work well if the interests of the supervisors are very diﬀerent. Although the analysis focuses
on multinational banks, similar problems arise in other areas. An obvious example are ￿nan-
cial conglomerates. In many countries, the diﬀerent sections of a conglomerate (i.e. banks,
insurance companies, etc.) are supervised by separate agencies with diﬀerent objectives. For
example, systemic risks have typically not been considered as important in insurance as they are
in banking or even securities (Skipper, 1996). Consolidated supervision requires these agencies
to cooperate and exchange information.17 Here, similar con￿icts of interests arise that could
be studied using the methodology developed in this paper.
17BIS have issued guidelines of how this cooperation should work (BIS, 1999). The general principles are
essentially the same as for the supervision of multinational banks.
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D.C., pp. 151-223.A Proofs of Lemmata, Propositions, and Remarks
A.1 Proof of Remark 1
The proof of the ￿rst part follows directly from the expressions for  and . W eh a v et h a t

 ≤ 0 and 
 ≥ 0 (
  0 and 
  0)i ﬀ  ≤ () (1 − )2
 + ,
which is equivalent to  ≥ (). Therefore, {	}
{	} is increasing in . Finally,
it follows from (3) that the ￿rst best closure rule is unaﬀected by 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof consists in showing that 






 () is implementable, it is the second best mechanism as it replicates the ￿rst best solution
and participation in the mechanism can be ensured through a lump-sum payment ex-ante. We
write ∆(	 )=(  + ) −  ,  = 	,w h e r e	    0. Denote the signal that the
s u p e r v i s o r si nc o u n t r y and  send about their type by  and , respectively, and write
the direct mechanism chosen by the supervisors as
{
()	
 ()	 ()	 ()}()∈[01]￿[01],
where () is the transfer from country ! to country  and 
() indicates the minimum
value of  for which the bank is allowed to stay open as a function of , 	! ∈ {	} and




 (•). Consider the situation at
time " =1after the types have been realized. Assuming truthtelling by the foreign supervisor,
















The model satis￿es the single crossing (-) condition as 2((	 ))

 = −  0.I t
follows from a standard result in the mechanism design literature that 


 (•) is implementable,
because it is decreasing (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3




 (),  = {2		− 1}; (ii) 1
()  0; (iii) 1 
	−1
 (); (iv) 1
()  0;




2 . Conditions (i) - (iii) are necessary to ensure that the signalling rule





 )  0 and from
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 and 
	−1
 should lead to a diﬀerent closure decision for some








 ()} de￿ned in Proposition 2 satisfy always condition (i).I t
is furthermore easy to show that condition (ii) holds iﬀ. (7) holds, while condition (iv) is
equivalent to (6). Condition (v) is satis￿ed iﬀ. (8) holds. Finally, condition (iii) is implied by
1




 ()) = 0.
For an equilibrium of type 2 with  intervals to exist, the relevant conditions are: (i)
1
()  0; (ii) 1




2 .W e￿nd that (i) is equivalent to condition
(10), and (ii) and (iii) hold iﬀ.( 9 )i ss a t i s ￿ed.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 1











2( − 1)2 − 1
2( − 1)2 }	
2( − 1)2






2( − 1)2 − 1
2( − 1)2 }	
2( − 1)2
2( − 1)2 − 1
]
for 2 ≤  .
A.5 Proof of Corollary 3
Consider the ￿rst part of the corollary. From (8) and (9) follows that an equilibrium of type 1
with  i n t e r v a l se x i s t so n l yi f ≥ 
(−1)−(2−1)
(2(−1)) a n da ne q u i l i b r i u mo ft y p e
2w i t h +1intervals exists only if ( +1 ) 
 − (2 +1 ) 
(2( +1 ) ) . The two equilibria
can therefore coexist only if  
 ( +1 ) . It follows from (9) and (10) that this condition is
never satis￿ed when the equilibrium of type 2 with  +1intervals exists.
Consider now the second part. Suppose that  ≥  and that the maximal number of intervals
that can be used in an equilibrium of type 2 is .T h i si m p l i e st h a t
( +1 ) 
 − (2 +1 ) 
2( +1 )≤ 
( − 1) − (2 − 1)
2( − 1). (1.a)
As method of proof, we want to show that whenever the equilibrium of type 2 with 
intervals exists, the equilibrium of type 1 with  +1intervals also exists. Equations (1.a) and
(6) imply that the equilibrium of type 1 with  +1intervals exists iﬀ.  ≤ 22
(22 − 1).
From 1 ≥  ≥  and (1.a) follows that 1 − 1
2 ≤  ≤ 1 − 1
2( +1 ) 2.F i r s tc o n s i d e rt h e
region 1 − 1
2 ≤  ≤ 1 − 1
22. From equation (9) follows that a necessary condition for the
equilibrium of type 2 with  intervals to exist is  ≤ 
( − 1) − (2 − 1)




(22−1) for  ≤ 1−1
22, the equilibrium of type 1 exists
whenever the one of type 2 does. Finally, consider the region 1−1
22 ≤  ≤ 1−1
2(+1) 2.
Here, it follows from  ≤ 1 ≤ 22
(22 − 1) that there always exists an equilibrium of type 1
with  +1intervals and proof follows.A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
We will show below that whenever the equilibria of type 1 with  and with  +1intervals
coexist, the equilibrium with  +1intervals gives the highest welfare in both countries. It
follows from Corollary 3 that there are two additional cases to consider: 1) equilibria of type
2w i t h and with  +1intervals coexist, and 2) an equilibrium of type 1 with  +1and an
equilibrium of type 2 with  intervals coexist. The method of proof follows here closely the
one used for equilibria of type 1, so the proofs have been left out. Details are available upon
request.




(+1),  = 	 and  =1 		.
This implies that there are 2 − 1 areas where the closure decision is diﬀerent in the two
equilibria. In  o ft h e s ea r e a s ,t h eb a n kw o u l dr e m a i no p e ni nt h e interval but close in the
 +1interval equilibrium. Denote these areas by #,  =1 		. In the other  − 1 areas,
the bank would be closed in the  i n t e r v a lb u tr e m a i no p e ni nt h e +1interval equilibrium.
Denote these areas $,  =1 		 − 1. # and $ are de￿ned as follows:
# ≡ {(	 ) |  ∈ (
−1
 ()	




 ( +1 ) ) }	
$ ≡ {(	 ) |  ∈ (
( +1 ) 	
()) and  ∈ (
	−
 ( +1 ) 	
	−
 ())}
We denote the probability that the bank belongs to area # and $ by
%(#)= 









( +1 ) 
	−
 () − 
	−
 ( +1 ) 
Furthermore, denote ( +  | (	 ) ∈ #) (resp. ( +  | (	 ) ∈ $))b y(#)
(resp. ($)).
() is the expected welfare of country  in an equilibrium with  intervals. The expected
welfare gain for country  when switching from a  to a +1interval equilibrium is then given
by







where ∆ has been written as a function of ($), because the expected welfare depends only
on the sum of  and . Undertaking some tedious calculations, it can be shown that
(#) ≡ (#)=
(22 − 1)( + )
2(2 − 1)(2 +1 )
for  =1 		,
($) ≡ ($)=
22( + )
2(2 − 1)(2 +1 )
for  =1 		− 1.
Hence,
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4[2	2−(2	2−1)][2	2−(2	2−1)]














∆ c a nb er e w r i t t e na s∆(	 )=(+)−  where  = 
  and  = 
 .
It follows that






=(  + )
3
Thus,
( +1 )≥ () ⇔  ≥
 + 
3




From Corollary 2 follows that these two conditions are satis￿ed when the  interval equilib-
rium exists.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 3
We prove the proposition for  ≥ , i.e. for  ≤ (1 − )2
 + , where the equilibrium with
the highest number of intervals is of type 1 (Corollary 3). The proof for  ≤  is analogous.





































































 (	 )) is a constant that is independent
of   and  ,  = 	, are positive constants where  =  
 and  =  
.W eh a v e









2=(   +  )












4. Calculations show that for the set of parameters considered, it
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2]. We will use this result in the
following.
When a change in  occurs, notice that '
2 is not aﬀected. All changes in expected welfare




((1 − )(1 + ) − 1 − )(1 − ) − ( − )




((1 − )(1 + ) − 1 − )(1 − ) − ( − )
(1 − (1 − ))2 
Since the only diﬀerence being the denominator, it is easy to see that 
 ≥ 
 .T h u s ,
we can de￿ne a constant ( =
(1−(1−))
2
(1+(1−))2 ∈ [0	1] so that 

























  0, we separately show that
(	)
 ≥ 0 and
(	)





−( − 1)(( − 1)( − )(3 +  − 6') − (2 +  − 3'))
3(2 − 1)2 
Hence,
(	)
 ≥ 0 iﬀ.
( − 1)( − )(3 +  − 6') − (2 +  − 3') ≤ 0. (2a)
The left hand side (LHS) of (2a) is decreasing in ,b e c a u s e'and  ≤ 2.I ti st h u s
enough to show that
(	)
 ≥ 0 for  =2 . Here, (2a) reduces to 2( − )(3 +  − 6') −
(2 +  − 3')  0.U s i n g 2,w e￿nd that 2( − )(3 +  − 6') − (2 +  − 3')  0
for ' =  and for ' =(  + )
2. Since the derivative of the LHS of (2a) wrt. ' t a k e so na
constant sign, this implies that
(	)








( − 1)(( − 1)( − )( +3  − 6') − ( +2  − 3'))
3(2 − 1)2 
Hence, sign(
(	)
 )=sign((−1)(−)(+3−6')−(+2−3')). Since (+)
2 ≥ ',
 +2  − 3' ≥ 0.I ti st h u ss u ﬃcient to show that  +3  − 6' ≤ 0.S i n c e' =   +  ,w e
have:










Finally, the assumption  ≥ 1
2 implies that 1+ 2
3(1−)  2. It follows then from Corollary 2
that
(	)
 ≥ 0, which concludes the proof.
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We consider the maximal number of intervals that can be sustained in equilibrium before and
after an increase in . Suppose that there exists an equilibrium with  intervals before and
after the increase. It is possible that the type of equilibrium changes after the increase in ,
for example, from type 1 to type 2. If so, notice that the welfare function is continuous at the
point where the type of equilibrium changes, because 
()=
+1
 () and 
()=
() when
equation (8) holds with equality. From continuity of the welfare function and Lemma 3 follows
then that the welfare is decreasing in . Suppose now that there exists an equilibrium with
 intervals before the change but only  −  intervals after the change, 0. It follows from
Corollary 1 that there also exists an equilibrium with  −  intervals before the change in .
A r g u i n ga sa b o v e ,w eh a v et h a tt h ew e l f a r eo ft h e− interval equilibrium is decreasing in .
Using Proposition 4, it follows that the welfare of the  interval equilibrium before the increase
in  is higher than the welfare of the  −  interval after the increase.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 6
We derive the optimal investment decision of the bank. To do so, it is necessary to consider
diﬀerent regions. The calculations of some of the expressions are quite long and tedious and
have been left out. They are available upon request.
Region I: 
  2 Comparing equations (11), (12), and (13), we see that investing one or
two units in the host country is the pro￿t maximizing strategy.
Region II: 2 ≥ 
  8
7 Equations (11) and (12) show that Π20(	)  Π02(	),
because  . Therefore, we compare now and in the following two regions Π11(		) and
Π20(	). In region II only the two interval equilibrium exists when the bank invests in both
countries. Calculations show that Π11(		2) is convex in .F u r t h e r m o r e ,Π11(		2) has




2 and this is the only extremum in the interval considered.
Hence, Π11(		2) takes on the maximal value at the border of the interval. Π11(		2) =
1 − 1203
343  Π20(	)=1− 3
3 for 
 =8 
7 and Π11(		2) = 1  Π20(	) for

 =2 . This implies that there exist a 
 ∈ ((1 +
√
3)
2	2) such it is optimal to invest two
units in the home country for 
 ≤ 






17 In this region, the supervisors coordinate on the three
interval equilibrium. Analyzing Π11(		3) as above, it is easy to see that it is optimal for
the bank to invest two units in the home country in the whole interval.
Region IV: 18
17  
 ≥ 1 In this region, there exists a  interval equilibrium,  ≥ 4.
From Proposition 3 it follows that the supervisors coordinate on a  interval equilibrium iﬀ.
2
(2 − 1)  
 ≤ ( − 1)2
(( − 1)2 − 1).S o l v i n g Π11(		)
 =0 ,w eo b t a i nt w o
solutions: 
 =( 2 +1−  – (2 − 1) ( − 1) + 1)
3( − 1). It can be shown that these
solutions lie outside the interval considered and that Π11(		)
 has constant, negative
sign for 18
17  
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(2 − 1), it follows that bank maximizes its pro￿t by investing two units
i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y .
A.10 Proof of Proposition 7
We derive the welfare maximizing investment decision of the bank. To do so, it is necessary to
consider diﬀerent regions. The calculations of some of the expressions are quite long and tedious
a n dh a v eb e e nl e f to u t .T h e ya r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .W ew i l lu s et h ef o l l o w i n gn o t a t i o n :
20
 (	) and 02
 (	) is the expected welfare of country ,  = 	, as a function of 
and  when everything is invested in country  and in country , respectively. If the bank
invests one unit in each country, the expected welfare is denoted 11
 (		) and is a function





































































  2. The welfare of both the home and the host country is the same whether
the bank invests one or two units in the host country. Obviously, the welfare of the home coun-
try is maximized when the bank invests two units in the home country. For the host country,
we have that )* 20
 (	) − 02
 (	) = )* 2(3 − 2) .S i n c e2(3−2)  0,t h e
￿rst part of the proposition follows.
In the next regions that we will consider, the welfare of a country is maximized when the
bank invests everything in its own country. We will therefore only compare the welfare when
the bank invests one unit in each country and when it invests two units in the foreign country.
Region II: 2 ≥ 
 ≥ 8
7 Suppose that the bank invests one unit in each country. There
can then be used two intervals in equilibrium. Let us ￿rst consider the host country. We have
that
* 20
 (	) − 11
 (		2) = * 992 − 962 +3 2 3 − 343 .
Analysis shows that 992 − 962 +3 2 3 − 343  0 for all  ≥ . We now turn to the home
country:
* 02
 (	) − 11
 (		2) = * 323 − 962 +9 9 2 − 343 
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 ≥ 1 De￿ne the maximal number of intervals that can be used in equi-
librium as +(	).S i n c e
  8
7, +(	) ≥ 3. Let us consider the host country. We want to
show that ,(	) ≡ 20
 (	)−11
 (		+(	)) is increasing in . Suppose that we are in
the region where +(	)= and consider an increase in .W eh a v et h a t)* 2,(	)
2 =
)* 40( − )( − 1)22 +8 ( ( − 1) − 2)( − 1) .F r o m  ≥ 3 and follows that
2,(	)
2  0.F u r t h e r m o r e , s i n c e )*[,(	)
]=)* 2
2(2 − 1)2 for  = ,
,(	) is increasing in . Consider now an increase in  so large that +(	)= − 1, (	)
is continuous in , because 11
 (		)=11
 (		 − 1) when equation (6) holds with
e q u a l i t y . W ec o n c l u d et h a t,(	) is increasing in  in all of region III. As ,(	) → 0 for
 → ,w eh a v es h o w nt h a t20
 (	)  11
 (		+(	)) in region III. A similar argument
establishes that 02
 (	)  11
 (		+(	)).
A.11 Proof of Proposition 8
If country  i st h eh o m ec o u n t r y ,t h ep r o ￿t of the bank in an equilibrium of type 1 and 2,



















0 ( + )
,

















0 ( + )
.
We derive the bank￿s pro￿t maximizing choice of home country, and consider region I-III
separately. The calculations of some of the expressions are quite long and tedious and have
been left out. They are available upon request.
Region I: The supervisors coordinate on an equilibrium of type 1 with  intervals inde-
pendently of the home country. Abusing notation slightly, we can write expected pro￿tw h e n
country  is home country as Π(		).I tc a nb ev e r i ￿ed that Π(		)=Π(		).
Therefore, the bank is indiﬀerent with respect to the choice of home country.
Region II and III: We consider ￿rst region II. Suppose that (15) is satis￿ed for  =2 .
Then, there is an equilibrium of type 1 with 2 intervals if country  is home country, but no
information exchange if country  is home country. Consider the pro￿ti fc o u n t r y is the
home country. Since there will be no information exchange, the supervisor closes the bank if
    {0	− ()}. The conditions ≤ 2 and  ≤  − 1
4 imply that  ≥ 1
2
Using ()=1 






( + ) = (9
8 − 2
2),
w h i c hi sl e s st h a nΠ(		2). Hence, the bank prefers country  as the home country. Suppose
now that (15) is satis￿ed for some 2. There is then an equilibrium of type 1 with  intervals
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the home country. Solving the equation Π(		−1) = Π(		) in ,w e￿nd three roots
that all do not belong to region II. Therefore, Π(		)−Π(		−1) takes on a constant
sign in region II. Finally, by considering the pro￿tf o r(	)=( 1 	(2( − 1)2 − 1)
2( − 1)2)
belonging to region II, we ￿nd that the bank prefers country  as home country. A similar
argument establishes the claim for region III.
A.12 Proof of Proposition 9
Suppose that country  is the home country. The expected joint welfare when the supervisors

























































We now derive the welfare maximizing choice of home country, and consider region I-III
separately. The calculations of some of the expressions are quite long and tedious and have
been left out. They are available upon request.
Region I: The supervisors coordinate on an equilibrium of type 1 with  intervals indepen-
dently of the home country. The expected welfare when country  is elected home country can
be written as (		).S i n c e(		)=(		), the joint welfare does not depend
on the home country.
Region II and III: We consider ￿rst region II. Suppose that (15) is satis￿ed for  =
2. There is an equilibrium of type 1 with 2 intervals if country  is home country, but no
information exchange otherwise. Consider the welfare if country  is the home country. Arguing














Comparing this expression to (		2),w e￿nd that the expected welfare is highest when
country A is the home country if and only if
−(9 + 4(3 + 4) − 6 − 16 − 322 − 12(3 + 4 − 8)


 (0)) ≥ 0 (17)
The left hand side of equation (17) is decreasing in 


 (0) since  ≤ 2 − 3




 (0) = ( + )
2, equation (17) reduces to (3 + 2 − 4)(−3+4  +4 ) ≥ 0,b e c a u s e
1 ≥  ≥ 1
2 and  ≥ 
2. Therefore, the joint welfare is maximized when country A is home
country for all 


 (0) ≤ ( + )
2. Suppose now that (15) is satis￿ed for some 2.T h e
welfare is (		) if country  is home country and (		 − 1) if country  is home




 (0)  0 in region
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
 (0) = ( + )
2. W ec o n c l u d et h a t
(		)  (		 − 1) in region II for 


 (0) ≤ ( + )
2. An analogous argument
establishes the claim for region III.
A.13 Proof of Proposition 10
First, we derive the set of incentive compatible mechanisms without sidepayments. Afterwards,
we ￿nd necessary conditions for an outcome induced by such a mechanism to be sustainable
as an equilibrium of a cheap talk game. Finally, we show that if the necessary conditions are
satis￿ed, the outcome of the mechanism can be sustained as an equilibrium of the cheap talk
game considered in the text.
A.13.1 Mechanisms without sidepayments
Denote by Φ(•) a mechanism. It indicates for a given value of  the minimal value of  for
which the bank is allowed to stay open, 	! = 	 and  6= !. The timing is the following: The
supervisors signal their type. Afterwards, the mechanism decides on closure. If  ≤ Φ(),t h e
bank is closed. Otherwise, it continues. Invoking the revelation principle, we restrict attention
to incentive compatible mechanisms.
Lemma 4 Φ(•) cannot be continuously increasing or decreasing on an open set.
Proof. Denote country ￿s most preferred mechanism Φ∗
().I np a r t i c u l a r ,Φ∗
() ≡  − 
and Φ∗
() ≡  − . Suppose that there exists some  belonging to the open set (	)
st. Φ()  Φ∗
().I f Φ(•) were strictly decreasing on (	), there would exist some - st.
Φ()  Φ( − -) ≤ Φ∗
(). Therefore, if the true type was ,t h es u p e r v i s o ri nc o u n t r y
would have an incentive to deviate and signal the type  − -. Similarly, the supervisor would
deviate to  + - if Φ(•) was strictly increasing on (	). A similar argument applies to the
case of Φ()  Φ∗
(). Hence, if Φ(•) were strictly increasing or decreasing on (	),t h eo n l y
mechanism that could induce truthtelling by country ￿s supervisor would be Φ()=Φ∗
()
for all  ∈ (	).H o w e v e r , a s  6= , Φ()=Φ∗
() would not induce truthtelling by the
supervisor in country !, 	! ∈ {	} and  6= !. ¥
We know from Lemma 1 that the mechanism has to consist of constant segments plus
￿jumps.￿ Consider a mechanism where the possible types of country ,  ∈ {	}, are divided





















 ()  
() 
+1
 (),w h e r eΦ()=! for  ∈ 
 and Φ()=0
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∀  ∈ 
 (∀  ∈ 
+1
 ). These constraints reduce to:
(! − 0
!)∆ (	(! + 0
!)
2)
≤ 0 ∀ ∈ 





Part i) of the lemma then follows from ! 6= 0
! and continuity of ∆.S i n c e∆
  0,
it has to hold that !  0




There are four diﬀerent types of mechanisms possible depending on the initial and the
terminal value of Φ(•).W ed e n o t et h e s em e c h a n i s m sΦ"(•) where  ∈ {1	2	3	4} indicates the
type.
Type 1 mechanisms are characterized by Φ1(0) = 
	−1
 ()  1, Φ1(1) = 0,a n d =  = .
Using Lemma 5, we obtain a system of 2(−1) equations and unknowns, which determines the














() =0 for  =1 		 − 1.
If country  signals a  that belongs to interval 




Type 2 mechanisms are characterized by Φ2(0) = 1, Φ2(1) = 0,  =  +1 ,a n d = .
Using Lemma 5, we obtain a system of 2 − 1 equations and unknowns:
∆ 





2 =0 for  =1 			 (20)
∆ (
	+1−
 ( +1 )+
	−
 ( +1 ) ) 
2	
() =0 for  =1 		− 1.
If the home country signals a  that belongs to interval 
, the bank is closed if the host
country signals that  ≤ 
	+1−
 (). If the host country signals a  that belongs to interval

, the bank is closed if the home country signals that  ≤ 
	+1−
 ( +1 ) .
Type 3 mechanisms are characterized by Φ3(0) = 
	−1
 ()  1, Φ3(1) = 1
()  0,  =
 − 1,a n d = . Similarly, type 4 mechanisms are characterized by Φ4(0) = 1, Φ4(1) =
1
()  0,a n d =  = . We show below that an outcome induced by a mechanism of
type 3 or 4 never can be sustained as the equilibrium outcome of a cheap talk game, so there
is no need to characterize these mechanisms further.








 () for  =1 		.
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neighboring interval. As the single crossing condition is satis￿ed, there is no incentive to
deviate to any other interval as well.
A.13.2 Necessary conditions for a cheap talk equilibrium
We now turn to the question of whether the closure regulation induced by the above mechanisms
can be sustained as the equilibrium outcome of a cheap talk game. First, as  ≤ 1,t h e
home country supervisor never closes the bank if  =1 . Therefore, outcomes induced by
mechanisms of type 3 and 4 can never be sustained as outcomes of cheap talk games, because
Φ3(1)	Φ4(1)  1. Consider now mechanisms of type 1. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium
of a cheap talk game that leads to the same closure regulation as the mechanism. It has then
to hold that there are no types belonging to diﬀerent intervals that send the same signal(s), as
this would lead to the same closure decision. It is possible, however, that types belonging to
t h es a m ei n t e r v a ls e n dd i ﬀerent signals. Consider types in 	
().D e n o t eb y{1		 #} the set
of signals used by types in this interval. Since the cheap talk game leads to the same closure
regulation as the mechanism, it must hold that the home country supervisor wishes to leave
the bank open for all  after observing a signal in {1		#}. This implies, in particular, that
∆(0	( | )) ≥ 0 for all  =1 		'.
This is feasible only if
∆(0	(
	−1
 ()+1 ) 
2) ≥ 0. (22)
Suppose that we want to sustain an outcome induced by a mechanism of type 1 as the
equilibrium outcome of a cheap talk game. A necessary condition for this to be possible is
that there exist {1
()		
	−1
 ()} and {1
()		
	−1
 ()} such that (19), (21), and (22) are
satis￿ed. However, if such {1
()		
	−1
 ()} and {1
()		
	−1
 ()} exist, we know from the
proof of Proposition 2 and 3 that the outcome can be sustained as an equilibrium of type 1
with  intervals of the cheap talk game considered in the text.
A necessary condition for the regulation induced by a mechanism of type 2 to be sustainable
as the equilibrium outcome of a cheap talk game is that there exist {1
()			




 ()} such that (20) and (21) are satis￿ed. If this condition is satis￿ed, we know
from the proof of Proposition 2 and 3 that the outcome can be sustained as an equilibrium of
type 2 with  intervals of the cheap talk game considered in the text.
The necessary conditions are thus also suﬃcient. Furthermore, as long as we restrict atten-
tion to deterministic equilibria, considering more general cheap talk games does not expand the
set of possible equilibrium outcomes.
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